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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This appeal is the second appeal in the above-entitled District Court action. Whereas the 
prior appeal in this matter involved the statutory construction of Idaho Code § 72-915 and its 
effect on how appellees (collectively "SIF") determined how it was to distribute a dividend to 
policyholders each year, this current appeal instead addresses the applicable statute of 
limitations for claims made by policyholders for dividend payments under Idaho Code § 72-
915. The District Court in the underlying action ruled that a 3-year statute of limitation under 
Idaho Code § 5-2181 was applicable, applying this Court's decision in Hayden Lake Fire 
Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388, 111 P.3d 73 (2005) ("Hayden Lake"), because the 
gravamen of appellants' ( collectively "Farber") claims are based on a statute, not a written 
contract. In doing so, the District Court rejected Farber's argument that a longer, 5-year written 
contract statute oflimitation under Idaho Code § 5-2162 applied. By doing so, the District Court 
ruled that Farber's claims for damages related to dividends paid out in regard to the July 1, 1999 
to June 30, 2000 and July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 policy periods were time-barred. 
1 In particular, Idaho Code § 18 requires that "[ a Jn action upon a liability created by statute, 
other than a penalty or forfeiture" be brought "[wJithin three (3) years." 
2 In particular, Idaho Code § 16 requires that ''[ a Jn action upon any contract, obligation or 
liability founded upon an instrument in writing" be brought"[ w Ji thin five ( 5) years." 
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Farber now seeks appeal from the original April 30, 2007, decision of the District Court 
granting summary judgment to SIF in ruling that Farber's claims were limited by a 3-year 
statute of limitation, and the subsequent March 25, 2010 decision denying Farber's motion for 
reconsideration on the same question. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
SIF does not identify any additional proceedings beyond those identified by Farber. 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
This matter has previously been appealed to this Court, see Farber, et al. v. Idaho State 
Insurance Fund, 147 Idaho 307, 208 P.3d 289 (2009) ("Farber I"), and as such a lengthy 
recitation of the facts underlying the parties' disagreement as to the interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 72-915 is unnecessary, as such is summarized in Farber I. See 147 Idaho at 309-10. Instead, 
facts relevant to the statute of limitation question in this action are identified as follows. 
Farber's original Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed on July 
21, 2006. ("Complaint") (R.-35144, 8-26.)3 The Complaint asserted three causes of action: 
Declaratory Relief Payment of Dividends, Declaratory Relief - Injunction, and Damages, all 
of which were predicated on a statutory claim that Idaho Code § 72-915 "does not provide the 
Manager any authority whatsoever to distinguish among subscribers or to pay dividends based 
3 As previously ordered by this Court in its Order Augmented Appeal filed October 14, 2010, 
"the Appeal Record in this case shall be AUGMENTED to include the Reporter's Transcript 
and Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 35144." For sake of clarity, citations to the Clerk's 
Record in the prior appeal are denoted as "R.-35144," whereas citations to documents in the 
Clerk's Record submitted in this appeal shall simply be denoted by "R." 
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upon whether a subscriber has paid some threshold amount of annual premium," such that the 
Manager could not refuse to pay pro rata dividends to policyholders who had paid annual 
premiums of $2,500 or less. (R.-35144, 12-13.) The Complaint sought recovery of"damages in 
an amount equal to the dividends which they should have had paid or credited to them during 
each of the five years preceding the filing of the Complaint for or in respect to which the Fund 
issued dividends to some but not all subscribers." (R.-35144, IO.) The Complaint specifically 
defined the "class period" at issue as "the five years immediately proceeding [sic] the filing of 
this complaint and potentially for some time following the filing of this complaint[.]" (R.-
35144, 13.) Accordingly, Farber initially sought dividends for the following years:4 
Dividend Period Dividend Declaration Dividend Paid 
7/1/99-06/30/00 Prior to 7 /21 /03 Prior to 7 /21/03 
71 I /00-6/30/0 I Prior to 7/21/03 Prior to 7/21/03 
7/1/01-6/30/02 Dec. 2003 Jan. 2004 
7 /1 /02-6/30/03 Dec. 2004 Jan. 2005 
7/1/03-6/30/04 Dec. 2005 Jan. 20065 
4 As Farber notes, dividends are declared and distributed approximately I 8 months after 
conclusion of the policy period. (Appellants' Brief at p.4, n.I.)(R. at 250.) Thus, of these 
original policy periods at issue, while a majority of these policy periods may appear on their 
face to be barred by the 3-year statute of limitation, in actuality only the July I, I 999 to June 30, 
2000 and July I, 2000 to June 30, 2001 are at issue in regard to the statute of limitation 
question. (R. at 289-90.) 
5 By the conclusion of litigation, three additional periods had been added: 7/1/04-6/30/05, 
7/1/05-6/30/06, 7/1/06-6/30/07. (R. at 250 & 288.) 
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SIF subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February 13, 2007 on 
various grounds, including a request for ruling on the applicable statute of limitation, which SIF 
contended was three years, rather than the five years, because the gravamen of Farber's claims 
was statutory. (See generally, R. 16-99.) Following briefing by Farber, the District Court held 
a summary judgment hearing on April 6, 2007. (See generally, Tr. 4/6/07.) At hearing and 
foJlowing argument, the District Court granted summary judgment to SIF on the statute of 
limitation question: 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Let's talk first about the statute of limitation 
issue. The determination of the applicable statute of limitation is a question of 
law and for determination by the court. 
I have read Hayden Lake and Kelso, and it's certainly easy to see why there is 
perhaps some room for confusion, but I think the Hayden Lake decision makes it 
clear that if the true gravamen of the plaintiffs' claim is a violation of statute that 
the statute of limitations for statutory violations is applicable and not the contract 
violation. 
So I determine and find that the statute of limitations that is applicable to this 
action is the three-year statute of limitation for statutory violations, and I will 
grant partial summary judgment to the defendants on that particular issue. 
And, Ms. Duke, could you prepare that, please. 
(Tr. 4/6/07, IL 34:21-35:14.) 
The Court thereafter issued its Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Statute of Limitation, filed April 30, 2007, stating that: "Plaintiffs' 
claims and causes of action accruing prior to July 21, 2003, are TIME-BARRED, based upon 
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the applicable statute of limitation for statutory violations." (R.-35144, 43-45.)6 
Thereafter, on July 10, 2007, Farber filed his First Amended Class Action Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial, redefining the class and dividend periods at issue, but otherwise 
leaving unchanged the asserted causes of action and allegations in support thereof. (See 
generally R.-35144, 46-64.) SIF again sought summary judgment as to the construction of the 
dividend statute at issue, Idaho Code § 72-915, which the District Court granted to SIF on 
December 26, 2007 in its Memorandum Decision Upon Motions for Summary Judgment. (R.-
35144, 79-91, amended by Amendment to the Court's Memorandum Decision upon Motions for 
Summary Judgment, filed February 15, 2008, R.-35144, 96-98.) 
The matter was then appealed to this Court, which issued its initial decision reversing 
the District Court's grant of summary judgment on March 5, 2009, and remanding the matter for 
further proceedings. See Farber, et al. v. Idaho State Insurance Fund, 2009 WL 539960 (Idaho, 
March 5, 2009) (R. 141-148). During the reconsideration process before this Court, the Idaho 
Legislature voted for an emergency repeal of Idaho Code § 72-915 on April 29, 2009, as S.L. 
2009, ch. 294, § 2, thereafter signed by the Governor on May 6, 2009.7 
6 Farber mistakenly contends that "On April 30th of that year, Judge Morfitt ruled without any 
detailed explanation that 'Plaintiffs' claims and causes of action arising prior to July 21, 2003 
are time-barred based upon the applicable statute of limitation for statutory violations."' 
(Appellants' Brief at 5.) In doing so, Farber forgets the April 6, 2007 ruling from the bench 
issued by Judge Morfitt. Farber's implication that Judge Morfitt failed to explain the basis for 
his ruling should be rejected by this Court in light of the transcript of the April 6, 2007 hearing. 
7 Information regarding the repeal bill, S.B. 1166a, can be found on the Idaho State Legislature 
website at http://legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/2009/S 1166.htm. 
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This Court issued the Farber I decision on May 5, 2009, holding that Idaho Code § 72-
915 was unambiguous and that "the distribution of dividends must be done on a pro rata basis." 
Farber I, 147 Idaho at 311. (R. I 49-157.) SIF's requested reconsideration was denied by this 
Court on May 12, 2009, and Remittitur issued on May 27, 2009. (R. 158.) 
On remand, Farber sought reconsideration of the District Court's summary judgment 
ruling via his Motion for Reconsideration or, Alternatively, for Bifurcation of Class, filed 
December 4, 2009. (R. 163-65.) Following briefing, hearing on the motion was held before 
Judge Morfitt on February 26, 2010. (See generally Tr. 2/26/10.) Thereafter, the District Court 
issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, filed 
March 25, 2010, denying Farber's request for reconsideration of the Court's 3-year statute of 
limitation ruling. (R. 267-275.) In rejecting Farber's arguments, the District Court concluded: 
The Plaintiffs['] argument that a 5-year statute of limitations is appropriate 
because the contract incorporates the statute and but for the contract, the statute 
would be inapplicable is not supported by the Supreme Court's holding in 
Hayden Lake. Kelso supports Plaintiffs' argument that the statute is incorporated 
into the contracts. However, Hayden Lake sets the applicable statute of 
limitations for such claims. Plaintiffs have filed a class action lawsuit premised 
on SIF's failure to distribute dividends in accordance with I.C. § 72-915. Count I 
of the I st Amended Complaint seeks declaratory relief - payment of dividends; 
Count II seeks declaratory relief - injunction, and Count III seeks damages. To 
the extent that Plaintiffs cast this action as one for breach of cont[ r ]act, the 
Plaintiffs' contracts with the SIF incorporate the statute. However, but for the 
statute, the Plaintiffs would not be entitled to dividends per J.C. § 72-915. 
Therefore, the gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims is the violation of J.C.§ 72-915 and 
a 3-year statute oflimitations applies to Plaintiffs' claims. 
(R. 273.) Following resolution of the remainder of the litigation, Farber filed his appeal on this 
issue on October 7, 2010. (R. 309-314.) 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
SIF does not identify any additional issues on appeal. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
SIF does not seek fees on appeal in this matter, but requests an award of costs should it 
prevail, pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There should be no confusion that Farber seeks to have this Court overrule its prior 
decision in Hayden Lake, despite Farber's efforts to bury discussion of the case later in his 
brief-in-chief. See Appellants' Brief at 10. Farber's arguments that this Court must choose a 
longer statute of limitation, and that the actual gravamen of the dispute is contractual in nature, 
ring hollow and are unsupported by Farber's Complaint and Idaho law. 
The issue posed by this appeal - whether Farber's claims, the gravamen of which assert 
that SIF violated the dividend payment provisions of the now-repealed Idaho Code § 72-915 -
has already been resolved by the Hayden Lake decision, which plainly held that the 3-year 
statute of limitation governs claims "when a contract incorporates a statute and the 
allegations stem from violations of those statutes." 141 Idaho at 404 ( emphasis added). A 
review of Farber's claims in this litigation, as further illustrated by this Court's analysis thereof 
in the Farber I decision, amply illustrate that Farber's claims are wholly predicated upon the 
existence of Idaho Code § 72-915 - a statute only applicable to SIF workers' compensation 
policies. As such, the gravamen of the claims lie in allegations of statutory violations by SIF. 
In fact, in paragraph 8 of the Amended Complaint, Farber states that "(t]his statute provides the 
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sole and exclusive authority under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay dividends 
to its subscribers." (R-35144, 50)(ernphasis added). Without Idaho Code§ 72-915, Farber has 
no claim for any dividend, let alone any particular dividend payment methodology, a point 
conceded by Farber's counsel at hearing. (Tr. 2/26/10, 13:24-14:1.) 
Further, Farber's general unhappiness with Idaho Code§ 5-218 - and, more generally, 
the effect of the application of any statute of limitation - is woefully insufficient to warrant 
reversal of the District Court's decision. In the same vein, Farber's reliance on an almost 60 
year-old water rights forfeiture case offers nothing to the resolution of this appeal. (Appellants' 
Brief at 15)(citing Application of Boyer, infra.) 
Lastly, Farber's contention that this Court must utilize the longer of Idaho Code§ 5-216 
or § 5-2 I 8 misconstrues Idaho law regarding the interpretation of statutes of limitation ( and, in 
particular, the James v. Buck decision, discussed infra), as the statute at issue (Idaho Code § 5-
218) is not internally ambiguous. Similarly, even were this Court to look to out-of-state 
authority regarding rules of statutory construction for multiple statutes of limitation, there is no 
'substantial question or reasonable dispute' that the 5-year statute of limitation might also apply 
in this action, given that the Court has already addressed this very question in the Hayden Lake 
decision and plainly held that the applicable statute of limitation is three years. 
Accordingly, for these reasons, as discussed in detail below, the District Court's decision 
should be affirmed. 
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V. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Farber is correct in stating that "[t]he determination of the applicable statute oflimitation 
is a question of law over which the Supreme Court has free review." See Hayden Lake, 141 
Idaho at 403. 8 
A. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly ruled that the applicable statute of limitation for a 
claim made for dividends pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-915 is a 3-year statute of 
limitation pursuant to Hayden Lake. 
The primary defect in Farber's overarching argument - that this Court must select the 
longer of two applicable statutes of limitation - is that it incorrectly assumes that the statute of 
limitation applicable to a claim under an SIF policy is an open or otherwise ambiguous question 
of law in Idaho. It is not, as this Court has already addressed the issue in Hayden Lake. 
Farber's efforts to downplay the Hayden Lake decision - the primary precedent upon which the 
District Court issued its ruling - do nothing more than reflect Farber's unwillingness to 
recognize that this question of law is settled in Idaho. 
I. The earlier Kelso decision does not establish a 5-year statute oflimitations. 
The Hayden Lake case, which addressed the applicable statute of limitation in claims 
similar to those brought by Farber in this case, followed the earlier decision in Kelso & Irwin, 
P.A. v. State Ins. Fund, 134 Idaho 130,997 P.2d 591 (2000), wherein a SIF policyholder sought 
8 Tellingly avoiding citation to Hayden Lake, Farber's citation to the applicable standard of 
review is an almost verbatim quote of the standard enunciated in Hayden Lake, which standard 
does not expressly appear in Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp., 126 Idaho 162, 879 P.2d 1095 
(1994)(cited by Farber). Instead, nine pages of Oats are generally cited by the Hayden Lake 
court in support of its enunciation of the standard. 
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an injunction against SIF from "selling worker's compensation insurance at the artificially low 
premiums established by the 1996 amendments to I. C. § 41-1612(2) and (3 )" and went on to 
demand "( 1) the return of all monies to the policy holders held by SIF under the designation of 
'surplus as regards policyholder' in excess of the six million dollars of 'reserves and surpluses' 
required by I.C. § 72-911; and (2) an accounting and recovery of assets squandered by SIF 
through invalid and illegal use of monies in the surplus." Id. at 132-33. Although Kelso did not 
address applicable statute of limitations, the focus of the Kelso court on the statutory gravamen 
of Kelso's claims and its interaction with Kelso's breach of contract claims refutes Farber's 
unfounded contention that Kelso establishes a 5-year statute of limitation. 
The Kelso court first rejected Kelso's contention that it had any property interest in SIF 
assets, flatly stating that: "the SIF's statutory structure does not grant Kelso a property interest 
in the assets of SIF." Id. at 136. The Court then turned to the question of breach of contract, 
and in particular, Kelso' s assertion that "the SIF' s surplus has been accumulated in violation of 
the SIF's statutory authority and is in excess of the amount which is statutorily required by the 
former I.C. § 72-911 and, therefore, must be returned to the policyholders as dividends." Id. at 
139. The Court prefaced its discussion by noting that: 
It is undisputed that Kelso has a contract for worker's compensation insurance 
with the SIF. Any violation of the provisions of that contract would constitute a 
breach of contract by the SIF. Additionally, the contract necessarily incorporates 
the statutory framework which both created the SIF and governs the actions that 
can be taken by the SIF with regard to the SIF's funds. When Kelso contracted 
with the SIF it was entitled to rely on the statutes creating and regulating the SIF, 
and the limits those statutes place on how the SIF can invest its policyholders' 
premiums. Consequently, any act taken by the SIF beyond its statutory authority 
would also be a breach of the SIF's contract with Kelso. 
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Id. at 138. The Court ultimately held that Kelso's breach of contract claims as to return of 
surplus and for squandering of assets survived, at least, an Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
On the breach of contract claim grounded on the return of surplus demand, Kelso sought 
to force payment of dividends under Idaho Code § 72-915, the statute at issue in the appeal at 
bar. Id. at 139. In particular, while acknowledging that the SIF Manager had discretion as to 
when to declare a dividend, Kelso contended that such discretion was not unfettered. Id. Kelso 
contended that, as the surplus had grown larger than that minimally required by LC. § 72-911, 
"the policyholders are entitled to a return of the excess surplus." Id. The Court concluded that 
because Kelso was basing his claim on a statutory violation, he alleged sufficient facts to 
support a breach of contract claim: 
While Kelso's complaint has failed to allege a breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing with regard to the accumulated surplus, Kelso has alleged the 
surplus is in excess of what is statutorily required by LC. § 72-911. Although LC. 
§ 72-911 was repealed by the Idaho legislature in 1998, this statute was in effect 
at the time Kelso's complaint was filed. Because we have held the SIF's statutory 
provisions are necessarily part of Kelso's contract with the SIF, and Kelso has 
alleged a violation of these statutory provisions, we believe Kelso has alleged 
sufficient facts to support a cause of action for breach of contract on this issue. 
Therefore, we hold the district court erred in dismissing this claim. 
Id. at 140. 
The Court then turned to the 'squandering of assets' claim (relating to allegedly 
improper leases between the SIF and the State), similarly reversing the dismissal of that breach 
of contract claim. Id. The Court again focused on the significance of Kelso' s argument that the 
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SIF violated Idaho Statutes and held that: "[aJs we have previously stated, Kelso's contract with 
the SIF necessarily incorporates the SIF's statutory framework. Therefore, viewing all 
inferences in the light most favorable to Kelso, its allegation the SIF exceeded its statutory 
authority constitutes a sufficient claim of breach of contract as to withstand a motion to 
dismiss." Id. 
Notably, in discussing the incorporation of SIF' s governing statutes into the worker's 
compensation policy and the viability of breach of contract claims premised thereon, the Court 
was silent as to the applicable statute of limitation for such claims, a question that was to be 
shortly resolved in the Hayden Lake matter. As discussed below, Farber's unfounded assertion 
that the Kelso decision "immediately implicates J.C. § 5-216, the five-year statute governing 
breach of-contract claims" (Appellants' Brief at 9) withers in the face of Haydt.n Lake's 
subsequent, statement that "[t]his Court did not make any findings [in Kelso] as to the 
statute of limitation that would apply to the claims." Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 404 
( emphasis added). As such, this Court should reject Farber's mischaracterization of the Kelso 
decision as establishing any statute of limitation, in light of the Court's express statement in 
Hayden Lake that it did no such thing. 
2. The Hayden Lake decision clearly establishes a 3-year statute of limitation for 
claims based upon SIF's statutes. 
Hayden Lake followed the Kelso decision, and, in fact, arose from the District Court's 
consolidation and class certification of the Hayden Lake and Kelso litigation following the 
remand of Kelso, given the similarity of claims. Id. at 393. Thus, in Hayden Lake, the breach 
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of contract issues regarding demanded dividend payment due to the claimed excess surplus 
allegedly in violation of Idaho Code § 72-911, and the claimed improper real estate transactions 
between SIF and the State, were again revisited, in conjunction with other procedural-based 
claims. 141 Idaho at 393-94. 
The Court affirmed the district court's rejection of Haden Lake's and Kelso's efforts to 
force an Idaho Code § 72-915 dividend payment based on an alleged excess surplus claim, and 
went on to affirm the district court's ruling that application of a 3-year bar to the real-estate 
related claims was proper. Id. at 399 & 403-04. In doing so, the Hayden Lake Court 
emphasized that the Kelso decision made no ruling as to the applicable statute oflimitation: 
There is no Idaho law directly on point as to whether the 3-year statute of 
limitations for statutory violations or the 5-year statute for breach of 
contract applies when a contract incorporates a statute and the allegations 
stem from violations of those statutes. The district court's application of the 
three-year statute of limitations stemmed from its finding that the gravamen of 
HLFPD's 'claims were grounded in statute. 
In Kelso this Court held that Kelso's claims that the SIF "acted beyond its 
statutory authority" in real estate investments with the State survived a motion to 
dismiss. Id. at 140, 997 P.2d at 601. This holding was premised on this Court's 
determination that the SIF's governing statutes were incorporated into its 
contracts with its policyholders. Id. at 138, 997 P.2d at 599. This Court did not 
make any findings as to the statute of limitation that would apply to the 
claims. 
Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 403-04 (emphases added). The Court then went on to add that 
claims, the gravamen of which were based on statutory violations, are subject to a 3-year statute 
oflimitation and that such was the case with Hayden Lake's claims: 
HLFPD's breach of contract and implied covenant claims are based on alleged 
statutory violations. The district court looked to Dietrich v. Copeland Lumber 
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Co., 28 Idaho 312, 154 P. 626 (1916), which held that the statute oflimitation for 
a statutory liability applied, despite the fact that the case was brought as an action 
to collect on promissory notes. This Court reasoned that, "[a] 'statutory liability' 
is one that depends for its existence on the enactment of the statute, and not on 
the contract of the parties." Id. at 318, 154 P. at 628 (quoting 4 Words and 
Phrases, Second Series, 686). Though the district court recognized that 
Dietrich may not be controlling in light of this Court's Kelso decision, it 
stated that "[Dietrich} is useful in support of the proposition that the true 
gravamen of the plaintiffs' claims should control the question of which 
statute of limitations is applicable, rather than the manner in which the 
claims are actually pied." This conclusion is correct. 
Id. at 404. ( emphasis added). Thus, the Hayden Lake decision makes clear that, where the 
gravamen of a claim sounds in statute, a 3-year statute of limitation applies. 
Here, there should be no dispute that the contracts at issue - the SIF worker's 
compensation policy - "incorporate[] a statute and the allegations stem from violations of those 
statutes." 141 Idaho at 404. The actual workers' compensation policy, it;;elf, is wholly silent to 
dividends and any particular dividend distribution methodology. See Appellants' Brief, Exh. A. 
Notably, the decision in Hayden Lake was further buttressed by another decision by this 
Court in the Hayden Lake line of cases. See Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 
Idaho 307, 109 P .3d 161 (2005) ("Hayden Lake II"). In that decision, uncited and undiscussed 
by claimants in this action, this Court rejected an attorney fee request by SIF after receiving 
summary judgment against the Hayden Lake claimants. Id. at 312-13. The Court held that fees 
could not be recovered by SIF under either Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) or Idaho Code § 12-
120(3), again reiterating that the gravamen of the claims was statutory in nature: 
It is undisputed that the SIF's statutory obligations were incorporated into its 
workers' compensation insurance contract with HLFPD. The plain language of 
LC.§ 41-1839(4) indicates that it applies to all actions between insureds and 
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insurers. However, the statute also limits itself to those actions "arising under 
policies of insurance." J.C. § 41-1839(4). Black's Law Dictionary defines the 
word "arise" to mean "to originate; to stem (from)" and includes the example 
phrase, "a federal claim arising under the U.S. Constitution". Black's Law 
Dictionary (Gamer 6th ed.l 999)(emphasis added). Applying this definition, J.C. 
§ 41-1839(4) applies to litigation "originating" from insurance policies. 
HLFPD's claims arise, however, both by virtue of its insurance contracts 
and the statutory obligations governing the SIF's management of its funds. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing 
party in a suit involving a commercial transaction, defining a commercial 
transaction as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes." LC. § 12-120(3). However, where the gravamen of a complaint 
regards a violation of a statute rather than a contract or commercial 
transaction, J.C. § 12-120(3) does not apply. Shay v. Cesler, I 32 Idaho 585, 
588, 977 P.2d 199, 202 (1999). The gravamen of HLFPD's complaint was 
whether the SIF violated its statutory obligations imposed by its workers' 
compensation insurance contracts. Consequently, the SIF is not entitled to a 
reasonable award of attorney fees under J.C. § 12-120(3). 
Id. at 312-13 ( emphases added). Thus, both Hayden Lake and Hayden Lake II clearly establish 
that claims predicated on SIF'.s governing statutes are statutory in nature, and thus, subject to 
the 3-year statute oflimitation. 
Despite this clear precedent, Farber attempts to argue that Hayden Lake only goes to the 
question of some nebulous "operation or internal management" test that Hayden Lake makes no 
discussion of. Farber further argues, despite the fact Hayden Lake was discussing the breach of 
contract claim relating to SIF's real estate transactions, that this action addresses "the failed 
execution of a contractual duty owed directly to the Plaintiffs." (Appellants' Brief at 13.) 
Hayden Lake makes no such distinction, nor otherwise limits its holding; instead, Hayden Lake 
plainly addressed the broad issue of "whether the 3-year statute of limitations for statutory 
violations or the 5-year statute for breach of contract applies when a contract incorporates a 
APPELLEES' BRIEF - 15 
statute and the allegations stem from violations of those statutes." 141 Idaho at 403-04; see also 
Appellants' Brief at 16 (stating that "the statute in question and the contracts which incorporate 
that statute operate in tandem."). Moreover, Hayden Lake II (again, uncited and undiscussed by 
Farber, despite its relevancy to this appeal) puts the final nail in the coffin on this question, 
given that SIF was denied attorneys fees where it prevailed against all of the Hayden Lake 
plaintiffs' claims, including those claims seeking to compel a dividend payment under Idaho 
Code § 72-915, which is, of course, the nature of Farber's claim (the only distinction being 
amount versus methodology). Hayden Lake II, I 41 Idaho at 313 (holding that "[t]he gravamen 
of HLFPD's complaint was whether the SIF violated its statutory obligations imposed by its 
workers' compensation insurance contracts."). Thus, Farber's claims that SIF failed to abide by 
the payment methodology in Idaho .Code § 72-915 as inc;,orporated into the SIF policies fall 
squarely into Hayden Lake's enunciation of the 3-year statute being applicable to claims where 
"a contract incorporates a statute and the allegations stem from violations of those statutes." 
Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 404. 
3. Farber's own Amended Complaint establishes that the gravamen of Farber's 
claim is based on statute, not contract. 
Farber's Amended Complaint makes clear the statutory nature of the claims being 
asserted. The Amended Complaint asserts only three causes of action: Declaratory Relief 
Payment of Dividends, Declaratory Relief Injunction, and Damages. None actually assert a 
separate and distinct claim for breach of contract, and, in fact, plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
expressly intertwines a claimed violation of statute with references to contract: e.g., " ... such 
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acts and actions are in derogation of the contractual and statutory provisions ... " (R.-35144, 58, 
at if 26); " ... acted wrongly, arbitrarily, in violation of an [sic] law of the State of Idaho and 
contrary to the contract..." (R.-35144, 58-59, at if 28.a); " ... acted in violation of Idaho law and 
the provision of the contract. .. " (R.-35144, 60, at if 33); " ... did not have any lawful or 
contractual authority ... " (R.-35144, 62, Prayer for Relief, if 2) ( emphases added). In fact, 
Paragraph 8 expressly alleges that: "This statute provides the sole and exclusive authority 
under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay dividends to its subscribers." (R.-
35144, 50.)(emphasis added). 9 Farber offers no explanation as to how this action would be 
viable but for Idaho Code § 72-915 - certainly no express provision of the workers' 
compensation policy itself addresses dividends. Indeed, even at hearing on Farber's Motion for 
Reconsideration, Farber's counsel acknowledged thaJ there would be no action without Idaho 
Code§ 72-915: 
THE COURT: Without the statute, you wouldn't have a right to the money 
either; isn't that correct? 
MR. LOJEK: That's right . ... 
(Tr. 2/26/10, 13:24-14:1.)(emphasis added) 10 
9 These allegations and claims are also found in the original Complaint. See R.-35144, 8-26. 
1° Counsel went on to only argue that the Court should simply choose the longer breach of 
contract statute so as to not "cut off peoples' rights prematurely." (Tr. 2/26/10, 14:l-
7)("However, I think you have an abundant [sic] of law that we presented to you in the briefing 
that where there is a choice between a shorter statute and a longer statute, then the idea is that 
you go with the longer statute for the reasons cited and the cases that are before you. You don't 
want to cut off peoples' rights premature! y. ") Counsel did not, however, argue that there would 
be any right to dividends in the absence ofl.C. § 72-915. (Id., 14:1-15:6.) 
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As such, Farber acknowledges that his claim for dividends lives or dies based on Idaho 
Code§ 72-915. Moreover, this Court's decision in Farber I makes clear that the gravamen of 
the parties' dispute lays squarely on the interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-915 rather than any 
provision of the workers' compensation policy: 
Instead, the plain language of LC. § 72-915 demonstrates that the statute grants 
the Manager discretion to distribute a dividend when "there is an aggregate 
balance remaining to the credit of any class of employment or industry" and the 
Manager deems that the aggregate balance "may be safely and properly divided." 
The Manager's discretion is therefore limited to the decision of whether or not to 
distribute a dividend in the first place. The remainder of the sentence sets forth 
the method by which dividends are to be distributed, requiring the Manager to 
"credit to each individual member of such class" who has been a policyholder for 
at least six months "such proportion of such balance as he is properly entitled to, 
having regard to his prior paid premiums since the last readjustment of rates." Id. 
The phrase "any class of employment dr industry," when read with other statutes 
related to worker's compensation insurance, refers to the class to which each 
policyholder belongs for purposes of .determining the rate paid for worker's 
compensation coverage. The statute contemplates dividing the aggregate balance 
proportionately according to the policyholder's prior paid premiums relative to 
all paid premiums. To argue that this language could be construed to somehow 
grant discretion regarding how to calculate the distribution makes no sense, and 
would require this Court to stretch the plain language beyond its obvious 
meanmg. 
Farber I, 14 7 Idaho at 312 ( emphases in original). There is nothing in the Farber I decision that 
indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court has reversed its holding in Hayden Lake, or otherwise 
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held that the gravamen of Farber's suit lay in contract, rather than statute. 11 Further, there is 
nothing in Farber I that suggested viability of a LC. § 72-9 I 5 claim absent the statute, as this 
Court even recognized that the Legislature was empowered to change the statute: 
Because the statute is unambiguous, there is no need to consider the plethora of 
evidence and testimony provided by the Fund to support its argument that the 
Manager acted reasonably in choosing to distribute a dividend only to those 
policyholders who paid more than $2,500.00 in annual premiums. The 
arguments, evidence, and testimony provided to this Court would be better 
targeted at the Legislature, which is empowered to change existing law .... If, in 
the intervening time, it has become prudent to alter the statutory language related 
to the requirements for distribution of dividends, the proper remedy is to 
approach the Legislature to change the law. 
Id. at 313 (emphasis added). Indeed, following this Court's initial decision in Farber I on March 
5, 2009, the Idaho Legislature promptlypassed an emergency repeal of Idaho Code§ 72-915, 
signed by the Governor on May 6, 2qo9 (S.L. 2009; ch. 294, § 2), and, as such, current 
11 It is also worth noting that, in Farber's brief-in-chief in Farber I argues that "[tJhis case 
involves the meaning of LC. § 72-915," and that "[p]laintiffs and the some 30,000 members of 
the class they represent have protested this conduct in light of LC. §72-915." See Appellants' 
Brief, Docket No. 31544, filed July 30, 2008, at p. 1. Farber's contention that, e.g., 
"[pJlaintiffs' claims arise out of their contracts with the SIF" (Appellants' Brief at p. 10) should 
be challenged given the different objectives in each of the appeals - in Farber I, the goal was to 
establish SIF's liability through questions of statutory interpretation; Farber's current goal is to 
expand the size of class participants by attempting to recast the question as a contractual one. 
Given that Farber prevailed in Farber I, this Court should give fair consideration to employing 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude Farber from now disavowing his position in the 
prior appeal. See, e.g., McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 153, 937 P.2d 1222, 1227 
(l 997)(holding that "[i]t may accordingly be laid down as a broad proposition that one who, 
without mistake induced by the opposite party, has taken a particular position deliberately in the 
course of litigation, must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose.")(quoting 
Winmark v. Miles & Stockbridge, l09 Md. App. 149, 674 A.2d 73 (1996)). 
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policyholders have no basis in contract to demand payment of dividends m the particular 
fashion directed by the now-repealed Idaho Code§ 72-915. 12 
Accordingly, Hayden Lake (and Hayden Lake II, as well) clearly establish that claims, 
the gravamen of which are based on statutory violations, are subject to a 3-year statute of 
limitation. Farber's action, as demonstrated by his Amended Complaint and the Farber I, amply 
demonstrates that this suit is squarely predicated on SIF's alleged non-compliance with the 
dividend distribution methodology set forth in the now-repealed Idaho Code § 72-915, and that, 
without such statute, policyholders would have no basis to sue SIF. For that reason, the 
gravamen of this action is a claimed statutory violation, and as such, is subject to a 3-year 
statute oflimitation. 
4. Farber's forfeiture argument is ultimately an una-vailing nonsequitur. 
Further, Farber's claim of "forfeiture of existing vested property interests" rings hollow 
as, by definition, all statutes of limitation serve to cut off existing claims, including those that 
may otherwise be meritorious. (Appellants' Brief at 16.) As this Court has explained: 
"The policy behind statutes of limitation is protection of defendants against stale 
claims, and protection of the courts against needless expenditure of resources." 
Johnson v. Pischke, 108 Idaho 397, 402, 700 P.2d 19, 25 (1985). Statutes of 
limitation are designed to promote stability and avoid uncertainty with regards to 
future litigation. 
12 The repeal was made retroactive to January I, 2003; an appeal on the question of the validity 
of that retroactive component of the repeal is currently before this Court in CDA Dairy Queen, 
Inc., et al v. The Idaho State Insurance Fund, et al., Supreme Court Docket No. 38492-2011 
(Canyon County Case No. 2009-13607). 
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Wadsworth v. Department of Transg., 128 Idaho 439, 442, 915 P.2d l, 4 (1996). The 
Legislature has simp]y determined that the statute of ]imitation for statutory liabilities is to be 
three years, irrespective of whether memories are still fresh or faded, witnesses are alive or 
dead, data is available or is no longer avai]able, etc. LC. § 18; see also Appellants' Brief at 
7-8. Farber has not identified any authority that the application of Idaho Code § 5-218 to cut off 
expired claims (as-~~ statute of limitation does) is somehow improper or violative of public 
policy, nor was any such argument raised before the District Court. (R. at 110-115, 167-75, 
254-263; Tr. (April 6, 2007) at IL 29:23-33:3; Tr. (Feb. 26, 2010), generally). See Hoover v. 
Hunter, Idaho _, _____ P .3d 2011 WL 924040 (Idaho, March 18, 2011 )( affirming 
"[t]his Court does not review an alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse 
ruling forming the basis fpr the assignment of error.")(quoting Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. 
Total Success Invs., LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008)); accord Parsons v. Mutual of 
Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746, 152 P.3d 614, 617 (2007)("The longstanding rule of 
this Court is that we will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on 
appeal.")(quoting Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 106 P.3d 425 (2005)). While Farber may 
have a general disagreement on the philosophy and purpose of statutes of limitation, that fails to 
provide a basis to void a Court's application of an applicable statute of limitation. 
Moreover, Farber's citation to Application of Boyer, 73 Idaho 152, 248 P .2d 540 (1952), 
for the proposition that "[f]orfeitures are abhorrent and all intendments are to be indulged 
against a forfeiture," is ultimately nonsensical. Bover dealt with an individual attempting to 
change a diversion point for water his water rights, which was protested by the irrigation district 
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on the grounds that the rights-holder had abandoned and forfeited his water rights based upon 
non-use pursuant to Idaho's forfeiture statute governing water rights (LC. § 42-222). Id. at 155. 
No statute of limitation and, in particular, LC. § 5-218 is discussed, nor does the case at bar 
involve either water rights or a forfeiture statute. 
For these reasons, this Court should reject any argument that application of Idaho 
Code § 5-218 serves as an improper "forfeiture of existing vested property interests." 
B. There is no basis to assert that a longer statute of limitation should he applied, as 
there is no 'reasonable dispute' such that a different, longer statute should apply. 
Farber tacitly concedes that Idaho Code §5-218 is applicable, opting to primarily rest his 
appeal on the claim that if there are two applicable statutes of limitation, the longer should 
apply. 13 Farber's primary cited authority on this point is James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 727 
P.2d 1136 (1986); however, Farber mischaracterizes this decision. 
In James v. Buck, the Court analyzed the length of time permitting for tolling under 
Idaho Code § 6-1005 (relating to prelitigation screening panels in medical malpractice claims) 
as impacting the 2-year statute of limitation under Idaho Code § 5-219. 111 Idaho at 709. 
Notably, the Court was not selecting between two statutes of limitations, but rather, was 
interpreting a single statute regarding tolling of the statute oflimitation provided in Idaho Code 
§ 6-1011. In James, the district court had held that Idaho Code§ 6-1011 tolled the period for 90 
13 Note that, while before the District Court, Farber cryptically suggested a "multiple gravamen" 
theory. (R. 173, & 260-61.) This argument appears to have been appropriately abandoned on 
appeal, as Hayden Lake made no discussion of a "multiple gravamen" theory and such an 
argument would have to patently disregard the definition of "gravamen." See Black's ih: "The 
substantial point or essence of a claim, grievance, or complaint." 
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days, the time period stated in the statute. Id. at 710. This Court rejected that conclusion, 
noting that the remainder of the statute had not been considered: 
The defendants' argument centers in the second sentence of LC. § 6-1011, which, 
for convenience sake, we requote: "In no case shall a panel retain jurisdiction of 
any such claim in excess of ninety (90) days from date of commencement of 
proceedings." Taken in a vacuum, this sentence would seem to support the 
defendants. But there is more. Directly following the above sentence, § 6-6011 
next says this: 
If at the end of such ninety (90) day period the panel is unable to decide 
the issues before it, it shall summarily conclude the proceedings and the 
members may informally, by written communication, express to the 
parties their joint and several impressions and conclusions, if any, albeit 
the same may be tentative or : based upon admittedly incomplete 
consideration .... (Emphasis added.) 
This portion of the statute establishes conditions which must be satisfied before 
the panel's jurisdiction is terminated: 
(I) the panel must find itself unable to decide the issues before 
it; and, that being done, then 
(2) the panel must summarily conclude the proceedings. 
None of these conditions were satisfied here; there is no evidence that the panel 
was unable to decide the issues before it. In fact, on August I 0, 1983, the panel 
did in fact file a set of findings and conclusions. The decision was filed 48 days 
after the hearings before the panel were completed. Likewise, there is no 
evidence in the record that the panel ever summarily concluded the proceedings-
the panel's filing of its findings and recommendations refutes any argument that 
James' claim was ever summarily concluded. 
Id. (emphases in original). The Court held, then, that the statute needed to be considered as a 
whole: 
The district court erred in focusing solely on the second sentence of LC. § 6-
1011 and in ignoring the next two sentences. This squarely contradicts general 
rules of statutory interpretation, which include the rule that a court must give 
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effect to "all provisions of a statute," and "no one part should be rendered mere 
surplusage by" the application of one part of the statute to the exclusion of other 
parts. 
Id. (citations omitted). In dicta, the Court then stated, despite there being no Idaho case law on 
this point, the following: 
In addition, where two constructions of a statute of limitations or a rule which 
impacts directly upon such a statute are possible, courts generally prefer the 
construction which gives the longer period in which to prosecute the action. 
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Honeywell, 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 
1981 ); Salavea v. City and County of Honolulu, 55 Hawaii 216, 517 P .2d 51, 54 
(1973 ); Drug, Cosmetic & Beauty Trades Service, Inc. v. Mcfate, 14 Ariz.App. 
7, 480 P.2d 30, 32 (1971 ); Juab County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 
Utah 2d 491, 426 P .2d 1, 3 (I 967). Our interpretation of l.C. § 6-1011 today is 
consistent with that rule. 
Id. Thus, James v. Buck did not even involve the Court selecting between two applicable 
statutes. of limitation, but, rather, interpreting a single statute regarding tolling. Farber oites to 
no other decision by this Court in support of his argument and there are no such decisi~ms in 
Idaho. 14 
As such, Farber detours through other states' caselaw and the Am. Jur., pointing to 
authority that does little more than hold that, as a matter of statutory construction, where it is 
unclear which limitation to apply (either as a matter of competing statutes, or an internal 
14 The Court of Appeals, evaluating whether a plaintiffs claim for benefits from a former 
employer was subject to the 2-year wage claim statute or the 5-year contract claim statute, cited 
to James v. Buck, supra, in holding that the 5-year statute applied. See Latham v. Haney Seed 
Co., 119 Idaho 427, 807 P.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1990). However, the Court of Appeal's decision 
was reversed on review by this Court, which held that the more specific 2-year wage claim 
statute actually applied. See Latham v. Haney Seed Co., I 19 Idaho 412, 807 P.2d 630 (1991). 
In doing so, this Court made no discussion or application of James v. Buck. Id. 
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inconsistency in a single statute), the court will err on the side of caution in applying the longer 
of the two possibilities. A closer review of the authority more aptly demonstrates the kinds of 
ambiguities courts struggle with before applying such a statutory construction rule, none of 
which are before this Court: 
• 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions, §92 As the plain language of the section 
indicates, there has to be a "substantial question or reasonable dispute" at issue first 
before resolving the question in favor of a longer period. Tellingly, Farber omits 
from his citation the remaining portion of this section: ''Observation: To invoke the 
rule of applying the longer of two possible periods of limitations, both of the 
statutory constructions must be reasonable." (emphasis added). However, in the 
present matter, no such "reasonable" construction exists, as this Court has already· 
squarely addressed the statute of limitation question salient to this litigation in 
Hayden Lake and Havden Lake II. 
• Amco Ins. Co. v. Rockwell, 940 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. App. 1997) In Amco, the 
court analyzed whether Colorado's general two-year statute for torts or its 3-year 
statute for actions under the state's No-Fault Act applied to a claim for property 
damage arising from a collision involving an uninsured driver. While the negligence 
claim would ordinarily fall under the two-year statute, the court made clear that the 
facts demonstrated that the action was, in fact, a No-Fault Act suit: "[h]ere, it is not 
disputed that plaintiff was obligated to pay and did pay benefits required under the 
No-Fault Act. And, plaintiffs action is specifically authorized under § 10-4-
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715(I)(b), C.R.S. (1994 Repl.Vol. 4A) of the No-Fault Act, see Cingoranelli v. St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 658 P .2d 863 (Colo. I 983) (noting that § 10-4-7 I 5 
"preserves" tort actions against third party tortfeasors who do not have complying 
insurance), and was brought because the vehicle driven by defendant was not insured 
as required under the No-Fault Act. See § I 0-4-705, C.R.S. (1994 Repl.Vol. 4A). 
Under these circumstances, we conclude that plaintiffs claim was intertwined with 
the No-Fault Act and was brought 'under' it." Id. at 1097 (emphases added). 15 In 
the present case, Farber attempts to re-style his action as a general breach of contract 
even though none of his causes of action are labeled to be breaches of contract, and 
where the Complaint specifically avers - correctly - that LC. § 72-915 "provides the 
sole and exclusive authority under and pursuant to which the Fund can lawfully pay 
dividends to its subscribers." (R.-35144, 50, if8.) This is wholly distinguishable 
from the facts in Amco because that plaintiff plainly filed suit under a statute 
authorizing such suit, thereby entitling him to the statute of limitation afforded by 
that statute rather than by virtue of a last-resort rule of statutory construction for 
irreconcilable statutes. This Court has already addressed the application of Idaho 
15 Note, too, that the Colorado Supreme Court has outlined how this is a statutory construction 
rule of last resort: "When a court is faced with irreconcilable statutes, it first considers whether 
those statutes address the same class of cases, and if they do, then the specific provision prevails 
over the general one, unless the legislature evidences a manifest intent that the more recently 
enacted general provision should prevail. If specificity fails to resolve the conflict, then the 
more recent statute may prevail. If neither of these canons resolves the conflict, then public 
policy and common law doctrine dictate that the statute with the longer limitations period 
governs." Jenkins v. Panama Canal Ry. Co., 208 P.3d 238,244 (Colo. 2009). 
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Code § 5-216 or § 5-218 in statutory gravamen claims, and explicitly held the 3-year 
statute of limitation to apply. Hayden Lake, 141 Idaho at 403-04. 
In the Matter of Estate ofRenwanz, 561 N.W.2d 43 (Iowa 1997)-This matter only 
involved the interpretation of a single statute (Iowa Code § 633.410) regarding 
notice to be given to probate estate creditors. In particular, the court examined 
whether actual knowledge was sufficient to trigger a time for filing a claim with the 
estate, or whether mailed notice (which had not been made upon the creditor) was 
required. Id. at 44. The court strictly construed the statute, holding that mailing of 
notice was required, such that the creditor's actual knowledge did not adversely 
impact the commencement of the time to file a claim with the estate. Id. at 45. In 
the present case, there is no internal ambiguity to the statute of limitation at issue, 
nor has Farber made any such allegation. The purpose of Farber's citation to this 
case is unclear, as it is inapplicable to this action. 
• Traveler's Indemnity Co. v. Andersen, 983 P.2d 999 (Mont. 1999) - In Travelers, 
the Montana Supreme Court considered which statute of limitation might apply to a 
suit by Travelers upon a fraudulent insurance claim, where Montana had a two-year 
statute applicable to fraud claims, but an eight-year statute applicable to contract 
claims. The court held that the eight-year statute applied, given Montana's rule that 
"[t]he general rule applied to situations falling within the twilight zone of contract 
and tort law is that doubt must be resolved in favor of an action based upon 
contract." Id. at 1002. The court also noted that "[w]here doubt exists as to the 
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theory of the action - and, therefore, which statute of limitations should apply -- the 
general rule is that the doubt is resolved in favor of the longer statute of limitations." 
Id. at 1002 ( emphasis added). The court goes on, however, to explain that the 
question ultimately hinges on the nature of the claim, a summary not quoted by 
Farber: '"The choice of which statute of limitation should apply ultimately rests on 
a characterization of the essence of the claim.' Consequent! y, we look to the 
substance of the complaint to determine the nature of the action and which statute of 
limitation applies." Id. (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 16 The "essence of the 
cla.im" in Farber's action is, as Farber himself has stated, that Idaho Code§ 72-915 
"provides the sole and exclusive authority under and pursuant to which the Fund can 
lawfully pay dividends to its subscribers." (R.-35144, 50, iJ8.) Thus, the gravamen 
of the claim is patently statutory in nature, as the claims were in Hayden Lake and 
Hayden Lake II, and no doubt exists as to the theory of Farber's claim. Thus, the 
analysis performed in Traveler's is precisely the analysis this Court has already 
performed in Hayden Lake and Hayden Lake II in finding a 3-year statute applies, 
16 Note that the Montana Supreme Court chided a claimant for failing to recognize the gravamen 
test Montana employs (as does Idaho, as outlined in Hayden Lake), noting that plaintiff's 
"conclusory citation to Travelers notwithstanding, the plaintiff simply may not choose which 
theory to pursue in any situation." Tin Cup County Water and/or Sewer Dist. v. Garden City 
Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 200 P.3d 60, 66-67. (Mont. 2008). The Montana Supreme Court 
emphasized that: "A plaintiff cannot change the gravamen of the action to secure a longer 
period of limitations simply by virtue of mislabeling a claim for relief. The gravamen of a 
claim, not the label attached, controls the limitations period applied to that claim." Id. at 66. 
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and as such, the rationale in Traveler's actually supports the affirming of the District 
Court in this decision. 
Global Financial Services, Inc. v. Duttenhefner, 575 N.W.2d 667 (N.D. 1998)-This 
matter involved the determination of the applicable statute of limitation for suit upon 
an installment contract that had been assigned to another party. At issue was 
whether a federal statute of limitation applied, as the action would have been 
untimely under state law but still timely under federal law based upon differences in 
accrual. Id. at 669. Key in dispute was whether the federal statute of limitation was 
personal, and thus incapable of being assigned. Id. at 671-72. The court's statement 
that "we have a general policy of selecting the longer statute of limitations when 
there is a reasonable dispute over which statute applies," then, was made in the 
context of the court evaluating whether or not a statute of limitation could be 
assigned, a question of some dispute and novel to North Dakota. Id. at 671 (noting 
that "we have not decided specifically whether the benefit of a statute of limitations 
is assignable" and then contrasting the WAMCO v. First Piedmont Mort., 856 F. 
Supp. 1076 (E.D. Va. 1994) decision with decisions in other courts on the question 
of assignability of federal statutes of limitation)(emphasis added). Again, as 
discussed above, there is no "reasonable dispute" over which statute should apply, as 
this Court's Hayden Lake and Hayden Lake II decisions, in conjunction with the fact 
that this action is plainly predicated on the existence of LC. § 72-915, clearly 
establish that the only applicable statute of limitation is the 3-year statute. 
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• Zoss v. Schaefers, 598 N.W.2d 550 (S.D. 1999) - In Zoss, the South Dakota 
Supreme Court found ambiguous a single statute that had two different statutes of 
limitation without explanation as to the distinction: "Any person seeking to recover 
damages pursuant to § 40-28-18 shall file suit no later than one year after the 
trespass occurred or six months after he knew or should have known of the injury 
resulting from the trespass." Id. at 551 (quoting S.D.C.L. § 40-28-20). The 
legislative history suggested that the six-month limitation may have been intended as 
an additional statute for claims that may not have been discovered in the original 
one-year post-trespass period. Id. at 553. Based on this internal inconsistency and 
ambiguity as to the statute, the court permitted application of the longer one-year 
period. Id. 17 Again, as with the Renwanz decision, supra, this case appears wholly 
inapplicable to this action, given that the Supreme Court of South Dakota was 
attempting to address an internal ambiguity in a single statute, a point not at issue in 
this litigation, rendering referral to this case unhelpful and unnecessary. 
17 The court quoted Richards v. Lenz, 539 N.W.2d 80 (S.D. 1995), which emphasized that 
"such application should always be tested by the nature of the allegations in the complaint[.]" 
Id. at 85 ( emphasis added). The Richards decision involved suit asserting claims for negligence, 
fraud, and breach of contract, ordinarily subject to different statutes of limitation (3 years for 
negligence, 6 years for fraud and breach of contract.) Id. The court applied the longer period 
upon holding that: "[t]he Richards' claims arise out of their agreement with WRMH to provide 
marriage counseling and WRMH's action in assigning Lenz to provide such counseling service 
to the Richards. The allegations in the complaints lead to the conclusion that the gravamen of 
the complaints is as much based in contract as it would be in negligence or fraud." Id. 
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Thus, the out-of-state authority cited by Farber is unavailing. There is no ambiguous 
statute of limitation at issue in this matter, nor is there a 'doubt' or 'reasonable dispute' as to 
multiple statutes of limitation applying, as the Court has already resolved the question of the 
applicable statute in Hayden Lake. As discussed at length above, the Hayden Lake decision 
makes clear that "when a contract incorporates a statute and the allegations stem from violations 
of those statutes," the 3-year statute applies. 141 Idaho at 403. This Court's decision in Farber 
I, the allegations of Farber's complaint, the absence of dividend language in the policies at 
issue, and Farber's counsel's representations at hearing all make more than clear that this 
litigation exists only because of the claimed failure of SIF to make dividend payments by the 
methodology specifically set forth by the Legislature in Idaho Code§ 72-915. 
Thus, James v. Buck has no application in this matter, and there is no basis otherwise for 
Farber to contend that there is any 'doubt' or 'reasonable dispute' as to the applicable statute of 
limitation in this matter, given that Farber's complaint is squarely predicated on a claimed 
violation of Idaho Code § 72-915. Accordingly, Farber's argument on this point should be 
rejected, and the rulings of the District Court in this matter should be affirmed. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the April 30, 2007 decision of the District Court granting 
partial summary judgment to SIF, and, in turn, denying Farber's motion for reconsideration 
judgment on March 25, 2010, should be affirmed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 6th day of April, 2011. 
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